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THE FIRST GREAT COMMON 
George K. Walker* 
There are two, and perhaps three great common areas – outer space, 
the deep seabed, the Area;1 and (at least philosophically) cyberspace – 
available to humankind today. The first great common2 was, and remains 
in large part, the high seas.3 Part I traces the early history of the law 
                                                     
 * Dean’s Research Professor of Admiralty and International Law, Wake Forest 
University School of Law. This article was a basis of my opening remarks as co-
moderator at a panel, Resource Management in Common (Non-Sovereign) Areas: Law of 
the Sea and Space Compared, at the New York City International Law Association 
(American Branch) annual meeting Oct. 26, 2012. My thanks to the panelists – Henry 
Hertzfeld, Research Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs, Space Policy 
Institute, George Washington University; John E. Noyes, Roger Traynor Professor of 
Law, California Western School of Law and co-moderator; Matthew Schaefer, Law 
Alumni Professor of Law and Director of the Space, Cyber and Telecommunications Law 
Program, University of Nebraska-Omaha School of Law LL.M. Program; and Frans von 
der Dunk, Harvey and Susan Perlman Alumni/Othmer Professor of Space Law in the 
University of Nebraska-Omaha School of Law’s Space, Cyber and Telecommunications 
Law Program – for their review of an earlier draft and helpful comments. Thanks, also, to 
Professor Kate Irwin-Smiler of the Wake Forest University School of Law library for 
help in ferreting out sources. Errors and omissions are my responsibility. 
 1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 1(1)(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also DEFINITIONS FOR THE LAW OF THE 
SEA: TERMS NOT DEFINED BY THE 1982 CONVENTION 103-04 (George K. Walker ed., 
2012). 
 2. Cf. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 25-26 (1690), who wrote 
that God had given the Earth to humankind in common. My thanks to Professor Jonathan 
Galloway for recalling this. 
 3. Another debate, now over for all practical purposes, was sovereignty over newly 
discovered major land areas of the Earth, i.e., terra nullius. However, border disputes and 
arguments over islands and the like continue. Once criteria for sovereignty, first 
developed through the Peace of Westphalia, Treaty of Peace of Munster, Fr.-Holy Roman 
Empire, Oct. 14-24, 1648, art. 64, 1 Consol. T.S. 198, 319; Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, 
Swed.-Holy Roman Empire, Oct. 14-24, 1648, art. 9, id. at 119, 198, and with us today 
in, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 1., were satisfied, these areas became subject to 
sovereign States. Today most of these areas are independent States. See also infra note 42 
and accompanying text. Even Antarctica, with its lack of a permanent human population 
is potentially subject under the Antarctic Treaty, art. 4(1), Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 
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of the sea, the customary law of the high seas, and the freedom of 
the seas principle from the Renaissance to the mid-twentieth 
century. Part II analyzes the freedoms of the high seas as negotiated 
in the 1958 and 1982 law of the sea conventions, with reference to 
similar concepts in space law and for certain land areas, notably 
Antarctica. Part III relates the law of the sea to the law of maritime 
warfare and neutrality, a lex specialis alongside general oceans 
law, discusses special treaty rules under the conventions, the 
impact of customary law and jus cogens on treaty and customary 
norms, and the place of the law of international organizations, in 
particular U.N. Security Council and General Assembly 
resolutions, contrasting lawmaking for space activities. Part IV 
notes other factors in law of the sea issues for this century: small 
wars, often noninternational in nature, e.g., insurgencies and civil 
wars; non-state actors like pirates or terrorists, the growing 
influence of nongovernmental organizations, and “lawfare,” often 
waged in instant media like the Internet Part of my inquiry is to ask 
whether problems and issues that have come with high seas uses in past 
centuries might be revisited for space and seabed issues.4 Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote that “a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic”5 and that “the life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience.”6 George Santayana warned that those who cannot remember 
the past are condemned to repeat it,7 perhaps including past mistakes. 
Might these thoughts, among others that follow, be useful in analysis?  
                                                                                                                       
402 U.N.T.S. 71, to States’ prior claims. See also Walker, supra note 1, at 218-24; M.J. 
Peterson, The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law, 51 INT’L ORG. 245, 257-
60 (1997), (noting that the Antarctic Treaty, supra was an early model for space law 
concepts. It is ironic that the United States was the first to propose a new law of the sea 
treaty to forestall competition for ocean resources, over a year before Ambassador Arvid 
Pardo’s 1967 address to the U.N. General Assembly, calling for negotiations that resulted 
in UNCLOS); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea: An Historical Perspective for US Accession, 84 NAV. WAR C. INT’L L. STUD. 
111 (2008). Today the United States is among the few countries that have not ratified or 
acceded to UNCLOS. 
 4. Peterson, supra note 3, at 253-55 (reporting use of the high seas model as another 
concept for developing space law). 
 5. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
 6. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
 7. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 284 (2d ed. 1922). 
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I.  THE PAST AS PROLOGUE 
It is familiar ground that the seventeenth century debate between the 
English lawyer John Selden8 and the Netherlands lawyer and diplomat 
Hugo Grotius9 resulted in a victory for high seas freedoms,10 including, 
most critically for that era, a right of high seas navigation.11 (As The 
Netherlands’ power declined and Great Britain’s grew in the eighteenth 
and later centuries, Britain adopted a high seas freedoms policy.12). Other 
powers, including the young United States, followed the British lead.13 
What was the territorial scope of the high seas with its freedoms? Up 
through the middle of the twentieth century, the cannon-shot, marine 
league or three-mile rule prevailed for most States for a territorial sea,14 
                                                     
 8. JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM, SEU DE DOMINIO MARIS (repr. 1972) (1615); see 
also D.P. O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 5-6 (I.A. Shearer ed., 1982); 
DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEVENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 3 (2010); 
SAYRE A. SWARZTRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS 20-22 (1972); 
see also supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text. 
 9. HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE 
DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., 
1916) (1633); see also O’CONNELL, supra note 8, at 9-10; ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra 
note 8, at 3; SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 8, at 18-20. The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas had 
drawn a line for colonization purposes between Portugal and Spain; it had been thought 
that this also applied to sea areas and was why Grotius wrote Mare Liberum. O’CONNELL, 
supra note 8, at 2; ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 2. Cf. SWARZTRAUBER, supra 
note 8, at 13-18. 
 10. Grotius affirmed his view in 1646. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE AC PACIS: LIBRI TRES 
199 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1923) (1646). 
 11. O’CONNELL, supra note 8, at 10.  
 12. Tribunal decisions, treaties and the Royal Navy followed the trend. C. JOHN 
COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 66 (6th rev. ed. 1967); O’CONNELL, supra 
note 8, at 18-20. The Selden view held sway for 100 years, however. SWARZTRAUBER, 
supra note 8, at 22. 
 13. Freedom of the seas was one of President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points that 
were proposed as principles for ending World War I. Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points 
(Jan. 8, 1918). 
 14. See generally O’CONNELL, supra note 8, at 124-65, (inter alia commenting on the 
“decisive step” of the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1794, Act of June 5, 1794, § 6, 1 Stat. 384, 
made permanent legislation by Act of Apr. 4, 1800, 2 Stat. 54, which blended the cannon-
shot principle into a three-mile rule. The United States had claimed a three-mile zone a 
year before.); U.S. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson Letters to British Minister to the 
United States George Hammond, French Minister to the United States Charles Genet, 
Nov. 8, 1793, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440-42 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
1895) (The 1794 legislation thus confirmed what the Washington Administration had 
previously claimed. Congress had also enacted a 12-mile customs zone and a 9-mile 
licensed fishery zone, Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §§ 11-13, 31, 64, 1 Stat. 145, 156, 164-65, 
175). See also SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 8, chs. 2-10 (explaining that in the eighteenth 
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considered part of coastal State sovereignty.15 However, there have been 
dissenters as to the territorial sea’s breadth, and therefore where the high 
seas begin, throughout the centuries.16 A major development in the mid-
twentieth century was evolving national claims to sovereignty over an 
offshore continental shelf, beginning with the Truman Proclamation of 
1945.17 That claim was formalized in treaty law in 195818 and refined and 
modified in UNCLOS.19 Less well-recalled is a similar U.S. 
proclamation, also in 1945, relating to offshore fishing conservation 
outward 200 miles into the high seas. The proclamation carefully noted 
that these claims did not impact high seas navigation.20 
II.  A CLOSER LOOK AT HIGH SEAS FREEDOMS 
Beyond the offshore fishing zones, it was universally held that the 
principle of high seas freedoms prevailed. But then and now they were 
not unfettered freedoms. First, what were and are these freedoms? The 
1958 High Seas Convention lists four, “inter alia” (among others): 
freedom of navigation, freedom of fishing, freedom to lay submarine 
                                                                                                                       
century the seaward thrust of littoral State jurisdiction, as distinguished from coastal State 
sovereignty, did not stop at the three-mile line. Some States claimed more than three 
miles). See generally GEORGE K. WALKER, THE TANKER WAR: 1980-1988: LAW AND 
POLICY 260-61 (Nav. War Coll. Int’l L. Stud. v. 74, 2000). 
 15. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 2; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Territorial Sea 
Convention]; Convention on International Civil Aviation, art. 2, Dec. 7,1944, 61 
Stat.1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 1591 [hereinafter ICAO Convention]; see also R.R. CHURCHILL & 
A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 75-77, 81 (3d ed. 1999); 2 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY ¶¶ 2.1-2.8(f) (Satya N. 
Nandan et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter 2 COMMENTARY]; ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra 
note 8, at 58-69. 
 16. O’CONNELL, supra note 8, at 156-61; SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 8, at 89-108, 
124-25, 131-51. 
 17. Proclamation No. 2667, Concerning the Policy of the United States with Respect 
to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 3 C.F.R. 67 
(1943-48); see also 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 15, ¶ VI.5; O’CONNELL, supra note 8, at 
31-32, 456, 470-71, 483, 498, 553; SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 8, at 155-61. 
 18. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 26, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 495 U.N.T.S. 
311. 
 19. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 76-85; see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 15, 
ch. 8; 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 15, ¶¶ 76.1-85.6; ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 
8, ch. 5. 
 20. Proclamation No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (Oct. 2, 1945); see also  
2 COMMENTARY, supra note 15, ¶ V.5; SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 8, at 161-69; supra 
note 14 and accompanying text. 
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cables and pipelines, freedom to fly over the high seas.21 UNCLOS added 
two more, also inter alia: freedom to construct artificial islands and other 
installations permitted under international law, subject to UNCLOS rules 
for the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) rules, and freedom of scientific 
research, subject to UNCLOS’ marine scientific research (MSR) and 
EEZ rules.22 The freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines was 
explicitly subject to UNCLOS continental shelf rules; the freedom to fish 
was now subject to limits, recited within the UNCLOS high seas rules, 
for conserving and managing high seas living resources.23 By contrast, 
outer space and other celestial bodies, while they are not subject to 
claims of sovereignty, are open to all States for exploration; there is a 
general freedom of scientific investigation in outer space and on celestial 
bodies.24 
There are other important qualifications on high seas freedoms. The 
first is stated as “reasonable regard” or “due regard” in the High Seas 
Convention, and “due regard” in UNCLOS, for the rights of other high 
seas users.25 This means that one high seas user cannot exercise its high 
                                                     
 21. Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 
82 [hereinafter High Seas Convention] (The nonexclusive list and its qualifications in the 
High Seas Convention are considered customary law.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. V, Intro. Note 3-5 (1987) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; cf. H. Shirley Amerisnghe, The Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 1, 7 (Myron H. Nordquist ed. 1985); Bernard H. Oxman, 
International Law and Naval and Air Operations at Sea, 64 LAW NAVAL OPERATIONS 19, 
29 (1991). The High Seas Convention, supra was a model considered for developing the 
law of outer space. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 22. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 87(1); see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 15, at 
51, 170, 205-06, 296, 404, 427-8; 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY ¶¶ 87.1-87.9(I), 87.9(m) (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai 
Rosenne, eds. 1995) [hereinafter 3 COMMENTARY]; ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, 
at 145-58. 
 23. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 87(1); see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 15, at 
51, 170, 205-06, 296, 404, 427-8; 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 22, ¶¶ 87.1-87.9(I), 
87.9(m); ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 145-58.  
 24. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 1, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Agreement Governing 
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies arts. 3(1), 3(3)-3(4), 4-6, 
Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. Cf. The Antarctic Treaty, 
supra note 3, arts. 2-3, 7, 9 (providing for a cooperative research system. The Antarctic 
Treaty art. 4 preserves all sovereignty claims while denying any new claim of sovereignty 
based on activities under the Treaty.). 
 25. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 87(2), (also declaring the principle for rights in the 
Area, governed by arts. 1(1), 133-91); High Seas Convention, supra note 21, arts. 2, 
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seas freedoms to frustrate another’s freedoms. Sometimes the 
Conventions recite due regard principles;26 in other cases they are 
formalized in separate agreements, e.g., the Collision Regulations 
(COLREGS) for oceanic navigation, which spell out rules to allow safe 
passage at sea.27 
UNCLOS further qualifies high seas rules in its EEZ standards: 
In the . . . [EEZ], all States . . . enjoy, subject to the relevant 
provisions of . . . [UNCLOS], the freedoms . . . of navigation and 
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, 
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these 
freedoms. . . . States shall have due regard to the rights and 
duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and 
regulations adopted by the coastal State . . . [for the EEZ].28 
                                                                                                                       
26(3); see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 15, at 170, 206, 223-53; 3 COMMENTARY, 
supra note 22, ¶¶ 87.1-87.8, 87.9(j)-87.9(m). Due regard appears throughout UNCLOS. 
See generally WALKER, supra note 1, at 179-88 (It is the recommended rule for law of 
naval warfare contexts for certain situations.); INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN 
REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA ¶¶ 12, 
34, 36, 88, 106(c) (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1994). 
 26. See, e.g., supra note 24 and accompanying text. Other due regard standards lie 
deep within the treaties, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 79(5); High Seas Convention, 
supra note 21, art. 26(3) (due regard for other States’ preexisting undersea cables or 
pipelines when laying a newer cable or pipeline); see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra 
note 15, at 156, 174; 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 15, ¶¶ 79.1-79.7, 79.8(e)-79.8(f). 
 27. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 
20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16 [hereinafter COLREGS]; (replacing 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, June 17, 1960, 16 U.S.T. 794); 
see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JAN. 1, 2013, at 427-28 
(2013) [hereinafter TIF], and required by UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 94(3)(c); see also 
High Seas Convention, supra note 21, art. 10(1)(a). The due regard principle also appears 
in the ICAO Convention, supra note 15, art. 3(d) as a rule for state aircraft operations 
around civil aircraft, the Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. 9, the Moon Agreement, 
supra note 24, art. 4(1) (declaring, inter alia: “[d]ue regard shall be paid to the interests 
of present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of 
living conditions of economic and social progress and development in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations.”). 
 28. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 58 (Other lawful uses of the sea related to high seas 
freedoms, e.g., operation of ships and aircraft, are allowed in the EEZ if compatible with 
other UNCLOS, supra note 1, provisions. Articles 88-115 and other pertinent rules of 
international law apply to the EEZ insofar as they are not incompatible with Articles 55-
75. In exercising their UNCLOS rights and duties in the EEZ, States must have due 
regard for the coastal State’s rights and duties and must comply with laws and regulations 
it adopts in accordance with UNCLOS and other rules of international law insofar as they 
are not incompatible with Articles 55-75. Id. art. 58); see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra 
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Thus States using a high seas area that a coastal State proclaims as part 
of its EEZ keep their high seas freedoms but must look over Neptune’s 
shoulder to see how these fit within the UNCLOS EEZ rules. 
It might be argued that UNCLOS Article 88 bars high seas military 
activity as a high seas freedom, e.g., for navies to conduct maneuvers. It 
does not. Article 88 reads: “[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful 
purposes.”29 However,  
[t]hat provision does not preclude . . . use of the high seas by 
naval forces. Their use for aggressive purposes, which would . . . 
violat[e] . . . Article 2(4) of the [U.N.] Charter . . . , is forbidden 
as well by Article 88. . . . See also [UNCLOS] Article 301, 
requiring parties, in exercising their rights and performing their 
duties under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of 
force in violation of the Charter.30 
The result is that the high seas may be used for military exercises as an, 
inter alia, high seas freedom, so long as they are not employed for 
aggressive purposes. The “peaceful purposes” requirement is also in 
UNCLOS provisions for MSR and the Area.31 The interpretation should 
be the same throughout the Convention. The interpretation advanced 
                                                                                                                       
note 15, at 161-62, 170-74, 348; 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 15, ¶¶ 58.1-58.10(f); 
ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 84; supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 29. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 88. 
 30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 521 cmt. b (citing U.N. Charter art. 2(4)); see also 
UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 88, 301 (referring to RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 905 
cmt. g); accord, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, 244 (July 8); 3 COMMENTARY, supra note 22, ¶¶ 87.9(I), 88.1-88.7(d) 
(noting three views on the phrase’s meaning during the UNCLOS drafting phase); Frank 
Russo Jr., Targeting Theory in the Law of Naval Warfare, 30 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 8 (1992); 
see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 15, at 170-71, 207, 411, 430-31; Int’l Law 
Ass’n Comm. on Mar. Neutrality, Final Report: Helsinki Principles on Maritime 
Neutrality, in INT’L LAW ASS’N., REPORT OF THE SIXTY-EIGHTH CONFERENCE HELD AT 
TAIPEI, TAIWAN, REPUBLIC OF CHINA 24-31 MAY 1998, Principle 1.2 (1998); ROTHWELL 
& STEPHENS, supra note 8, ch. 12; Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 814 (1984); 
John E. Parkerson Jr., International Legal Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative, 
116 MIL. L. REV. 67, 79-85 (1987); see generally Boleslaw Boczek, Peaceful Purposes 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, 20 OCEAN DEVEL. & 
INT’L L. 359 (1989).  
 31. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 141, 143(1), 147(2)(d), 155(2), 240(a), 242(1), 
246(3); see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 15, ch. 16; MARTINUS NIJHOFF, 4 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY (Shabtai 
Rosenne & Alexander Yankov eds., 1991); MARTINUS NIJHOFF, 6 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY (Myron Norquist et al. eds., 
2002) [hereinafter 6 COMMENTARY]; ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 130. 
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above is buttressed by provisions in the space treaties, which recite the 
peaceful purposes language but also demilitarize space and other 
celestial bodies.32   
The high seas today are a “managed common area”33 in many 
respects. Movement of high seas areas into managed commons might 
offer thoughts for other commons. Development of ship collision 
avoidance rules is a commonplace example. Initially, the predominant 
high seas user, Great Britain, legislated rules; other States adopted them 
as customary norms.34 The pattern of national legislation also spread. At 
one time, the United States had several sets of navigational rules for its 
inland waters but today has only one.35 National legislation and 
customary law regulating collision avoidance have given way to 
multilateral treaties, the COLREGS,36 first negotiated at conferences and 
today developed by an international governmental organization, the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), a U.N. specialized agency.37   
III.  OTHER LIMITS 
There may be other limits on high seas freedoms, depending on 
circumstances. When does the law of the sea (LOS), conventional or 
customary, apply? It does not apply in armed conflict situations as 
                                                     
 32. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. 4; Moon Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 
3(1), 3(3)-3(4). See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 3, art. 1 (declaring that the continent 
“shall be used for peaceful purposes only,” and which prohibits militarization of 
Antarctica. The regime for Antarctica might be contrasted with the controversies 
involving the Arctic, now that global warming is upon us, the Arctic ice is receding, and 
formerly frozen straits and seas may become more open for navigation.). See generally 
ARCTIC SECURITY IN AN AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (James Kraska ed., 2013). 
 33. ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 146. 
 34. Cf. The Scotia, 81 U.S. 170, 180-89 (1871) (citing national collision statutes); see 
also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 
(Oxford Univ. Press 8th ed. 2012); ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (Oxford Univ. Press 9th ed. 1996). 
 35. Today’s U.S. Inland Rules are virtually the same as the COLREGS, supra note 
27. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY & MARITIME LAW § 14-2 (5th ed. 2011) (citing 
33 U.S.C. §§ 2001-38 (2006), repealed in 2010. The Inland Rules are now in 33 C.F.R. 
Part 83 (2012)). 
 36. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 
Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 (inter alia, amended by Amendments to the 
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Nov. 14, 
1975, 34 U.S.T. 497, 1276 U.N.T.S. 468, which changed the Organization’s name to 
International Maritime Organization (IMO)). 
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between belligerents.38 This is the traditional meaning of the phrase 
“other rules of international law” in the 1958 and 1982 LOS 
conventions.39 Today under UNCLOS “other rules of international law” 
may have a broader meaning in some contexts.40 The law of armed 
conflict (LOAC) is a lex specialis, and as between and among belligerent 
States and neutral States, the LOAC rule, which may be different from 
the LOS rule, applies in both armed conflict and neutrality law 
situations.41 The lex specialis principle holds regardless of whether the 
LOS rule is treaty-based or a customary norm;42 the LOAC, whether in 
custom, general principles or treaties, applies. The difficult problem in 
today’s world of relatively small wars is determining when the LOAC 
applies.43   
That said, it was, and remains, clear that the law of armed conflict 
recognizes the concept of the high seas, which like the high seas under 
the LOS is bounded by legitimately claimed territorial seas under the 
principle, in peace and war, of national sovereignty.44 
                                                     
 38. The LOS continues to apply among states not party to a conflict; these states, and 
belligerents, must abide by the law of maritime neutrality, however. 
 39. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, supra note 
21, art. 2. The phrase appears throughout UNCLOS. See Walker, supra note 1, at 267-68. 
 40. Walker, supra note 1, at 267 (defining “other rules of international law:”[t]he 
traditional understanding is that ‘other rules of international law’ and similar phrases in 
UNCLOS means the law of armed conflict (LOAC), including its components of the law 
of naval warfare and the law of maritime neutrality. In some instances, however, e.g., 
UNCLOS Articles 293(1) and 303, the phrase may include international law other than 
the LOAC in situations where the LOAC does not apply.”). 
 41. For a partial list of different standards, see Walker, supra note 1, at 271.  
 42. This is the present situation for the United States, which declared it will follow 
UNCLOS navigational rules. See United States Ocean Policy, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 383 (Mar. 14, 1983) (noting that the United States and its treaty partners remain 
bound by the 1958 LOS Conventions.). See TIF, supra note 27, at 390, 423-24.  
 43. For example, a problem in the Iraq occupation. See George K. Walker, 
Occupation in Iraq: Issues on the Periphery and for the Future: A Rubik’s Cube 
Problem, 86 NAVAL WAR COLL. INT’L L. STUDY 219 (2010). 
 44. See supra note 3. U.N. Charter art. 2(1) recognizes the principle of state 
sovereignty, traditionally interpreted to mean that, in the absence of governing law, States 
may act in their interest. National sovereignty, sometimes diminished or eroded, has been 
a fundamental principle since the Peace of Westphalia, supra note 3; see also CHRISTIAN 
L. WIKTOR, MULTILATERAL TREATY CALENDAR 1648-1995, at 3 (1998). The Peace of 
Westphalia began the modern State System. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 
1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20 (1948). Treaties and decisions invoking the sovereignty 
principle include UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 157(3); Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, pmbl., May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; S.S. 
Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 18 (Sept. 7); S.S. Wimbledon 
(U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. No. 1, at 15, 25 (Aug. 17); see also Declaration on 
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There are “external” limits on the UNCLOS rules, or the customary 
law of the sea. Although UNCLOS forbids reservations45 and requires 
most agreements to be compatible with its object and purpose,46 it does 
allow older agreements to stand if the Convention permits it.47  All other 
treaties, old and new, must be consistent with the Convention’s object 
and purpose.48  The general space treaties do not have such clauses;49 
                                                                                                                       
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations & Co-Operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Principle 6, G.A. Res. 2625, 
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970), reprinted in 9 
I.L.M. 1292; Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States 
& Protection of Their Independence & Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (Dec. 21, 1965); U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (states 
accepting U.N. Charter benefit of “privileges of sovereignty . . . [must] also accept its 
responsibilities”); U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. Doc. A/49/277, S/24111 (June 
17, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 956, 959; MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-23 (Brian Chapman ed., 3d ed. 1977); J.B. 
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 2 (Andrew Clapham ed., 7th ed. 2012); CRAWFORD, 
supra note 34, ch. 20; LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
36-40 (3d rev. ed. 1969); HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY? 
21-22, 235-37 (2001); JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 34, §§ 37, 107; LORD MCNAIR, 
THE LAW OF TREATIES 754-66 (1961); RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, Part I, ch.1, intro. 
note, 16 & 17; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 135-65 (Bruno 
B. Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); R.P. Anand, Sovereign Equality of States in 
International Law, 197 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 22-51 (1986); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering 
the United Nations, FOREIGN AFF. 89, 98-99 (Winter 1992); Jonathan I. Charney, 
Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 539 (1993); Gerald Fitzmaurice, 
The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule 
of Law, 92 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 49-50 (1957); Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values 
and Functions, 216 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 46, 130 (1989); Oscar Schachter, International Law in 
Theory and Practice, 178 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 32 (1982); C.H.M. Waldock, General Course on 
Public International Law, 106 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 156-72 (1962).  
 45. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 309-10 (permitting declarations and the like, so long 
as these do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of the Convention’s 
provisions or are otherwise allowed by the Convention); see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, 
supra note 15, at 20, 99, 129, 238; 5 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY ¶¶ 309.1-310.6 (Shabtai Rosenne et al. eds., 1989) 
[hereinafter 5 COMMENTARY]; ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 16-17. 
 46. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 311(2)-311(4); see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra 
note 15, at 20, 98-99, 125, 191; 5 COMMENTARY supra note 45, ¶¶ 311.1-311.8, 311.11. 
 47. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 311(5) (governing passage through the Straits of the 
Dardanelles and Bosporus.). See also 2 COMMENTARY, supra note 15, ¶¶ 35.1-35.6, 
35.7(c); 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 45, ¶¶ 311.1-311.8, 311.11. 
 48. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 311(2)-311(4); see also supra note 44 and 
accompanying text. 
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must there be reliance on law of treaties rules50 for later agreements, 
perhaps subordinate in importance to the early, basic treaties?  Chief 
among these would be use of a subordination clause.51 
If a customary rule is at issue, e.g., for a State that has not ratified 
UNCLOS but relies on its rules as statements of custom, are there 
persistent objectors52 to the customary norm?  Would this principle apply 
in space law? 
Will the Convention, or maybe custom based on UNCLOS, apply in 
an insurgency that progresses toward civil war and perhaps belligerency 
status, to a group challenging a recognized government? Will the 
                                                                                                                       
 49. All of these general agreements have provisions for amendments or revisions; 
presumably these could resolve inconsistency issues by negotiation. See Outer Space 
Treaty, supra note 24, art. 15 (only a provision for amendment); Agreement on the 
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space art. 8, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (same); Convention 
on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects arts. 25-26, June 29, 
1971, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space Liability Convention]; 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space arts. 9-10, Jan. 14, 
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]; Moon 
Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 15-16. The only exception might be the Space Liability 
Convention, supra, art. 23 (declaring that it “shall not affect other international 
agreements in force in so far as relations between the States Parties to such agreements 
are concerned.”). 
 50. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, arts. 30, 39-41; see also ANTHONY AUST, 
MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 86, 192-204, 233-34, 240-42, 255, 258, 342-43 (3d 
ed. 2013); CRAWFORD, supra note 34, at 378, 386; JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 34, §§ 
590-91; IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 94-98, 106-
09, 160, 183-85 (2d ed. 1984).  
 51. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 30(2); see also supra note 48 and 
accompanying text. 
 52. See CRAWFORD, supra note 34, at 28; JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 34, § 10, at 
29; 73 ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 5.4.1 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999); 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 102 cmts. b, d; Michael Akehurst, Custom As a Source of 
Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 23-27; Waldock, supra note 44, at 49-52; but see Charney, 
supra note 44, at 538-41 (existence of persistent objector rule open to serious doubt); 
Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 R.C.A.D.I. 
227-44 (1998) (doubting if persistent objector doctrine still exists); J. ASHLEY ROACH & 
ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (3d ed., 2012) (containing an 
exhaustive study of LOS claims protests, demonstrates that the persistent objector rule is 
alive and well, at least for LOS issues. Problems with empirical studies of States’ 
objections are that many lie buried in chancellery files because they may seem to have 
little publicity value when filed, they are subject to national security concerns, or States 
may have selective or non-publication policies like U.S. court rules on unpublished 
opinions.). 
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sometimes amorphous law of treaty succession apply if a new State 
emerges?53 How does this apply in a space law context?54 
Although there have been few claims55 for jus cogens56 standards in 
the LOS or space law, might that be a possibility in the future? 
The law of self-defense, whether considered as a customary norm, a 
customary norm with jus cogens status, or governed by U.N. Charter 
principles based on Article 51, remains a relevant LOS issue. If is a 
                                                     
 53. See generally Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 
Aug. 22, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3; Committee on Aspects of the Law of State Succession, 
Final Report, in INT’L LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE SEVENTY-THIRD CONFERENCE HELD IN 
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL 17-21 AUGUST 2008, at 250, 360-62 (2008) (UN succession 
conventions’ general acceptance; recent practice); JENNINGS & WATTS supra note 34, § 
62, at 211-13; Symposium, State Succession: The Once and Future Law, 33 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 253 (1993); George K. Walker, Integration and Disintegration in Europe: Reordering 
the Treaty Map of the Continent, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1993). 
 54. There still are substantial space assets of the former USSR in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, which is not a party, except perhaps through the law of treaty succession, to 
major space agreements except Registration Convention, supra note 47. See TIF, supra 
note 27, at 475-77; Committee on Aspects of the Law of State Succession, supra note 51; 
JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 34, § 62, at 211-13; Symposium, supra note 53; Walker, 
Integration, supra note 53.  
 55. Cf. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 15, at 6 (explaining “States that had for many 
years claimed sovereignty over the waters did not at first claim sovereignty over the 
superjacent air space and sea bed in the zone”). 
 56. See VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 44, pmbl., arts. 53, 64, 71. Jus cogens has 
uncertain contours. See generally AUST, supra note 50, at 279-82, 319; CRAWFORD, supra 
note 34, at 389-90, 579, 594-97; T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 177-87 
(1974) (contours uncertain); JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 34, §§ 2, 642, 653 (same); 
MCNAIR, supra note 44, 214-15 (same); RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, §§ 102 r. 6, 323 
cmt. b, 331(2), 338(2) (same); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 1945-1986, at 281-88 (1989); THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 44, at 313-33 (discussing U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 55, likely a 
jus cogens norm today); SINCLAIR, supra note 50, at 17-18, 218-26 (Vienna Convention 
principles considered progressive development in 1984); GRIGORII I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (William E. Butler trans., 1974); Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature 
of Jus Cogens in Contemporary Law, 172 R.C.A.D.I. 219, 262-63 (1981); John N. 
Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 9, 25-29 
(1977); Jimenez de Arechaga, International Law in the Last Third of a Century, 159 
R.C.A.D.I. 9, 64-67 (1978); Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus 
Cogens, As Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (1995). 
An International Law Commission study acknowledged primacy of UN Charter art. 103-
based law and jus cogens but did not catalogue what are jus cogens norms. Rep. of the 
Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., May 2–June 3, July 11–Aug. 5, 2005, U.N. 
Doc. A/60/10, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 221-25 (2005); see also Michael 
J. Matheson, The Fifty-Seventh Session of the International Law Commission, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 416, 422 (2006). 
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customary rule, might it supersede rules in treaties?57 If it is a jus cogens-
girded norm, it will supersede treaty rules. If based on Article 51, under 
Article 103, action in self-defense supersedes treaty rules.58 Self-defense 
is also a space law issue, if for no other reason than Article 103 of the 
Charter, which says it trumps all treaties, which includes those 
international agreements related to space law with “peaceful purposes” 
provisions.59 
U.N. Security Council “decisions,”60 as distinguished from other 
nonbinding Council resolutions, e.g., those recommending action, and 
nearly all U.N. General Assembly resolutions that are nonbinding,61 can 
                                                     
 57. Cf. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(1) (stating, “1. The Court, whose function is to decide in 
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a. 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court 
to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.”); RESTATEMENT, supra 
note 21, §§ 102-03 (explaining, “(1) A rule of international law is one that has been 
accepted as such by the international community of states: (a) in the form of customary 
law; (b) by international agreement; or (c) by derivation from general principles common 
to the major legal systems of the world. (2) Customary international law results from a 
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation. (3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may 
lead to the creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended 
for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted. (4) General principles 
common to the major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary 
law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules of international 
law where appropriate.”). 
 58. U.N. Charter arts. 51, 103 (Author’s note: this article is not a place to explore 
Charter era self-defense issues. Among these are anticipatory self-defense versus 
“reactive” self-defense; necessity and proportionality standards in self-defense; 
differences, if any, between the customary law of self-defense and self-defense under id. 
art. 51; alliance or coalition operations issues; self-defense standards for units and 
individuals during armed conflict, as distinguished from self-defense as a jus ad bellum 
principle; self-defense against individuals or groups involved in international criminal 
acts, e.g., piracy, slave trade, terrorism. See George K. Walker, Self-Defense, the Law of 
Armed Conflict and Port Security, 5 S.C.J. INT’L L. & BUS. 347, 348-66 (2009)). 
 59. See also supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
 60. U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48, 94(1), 103; see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 44, at 
207-11, 334-37, 555-56, 614-17; SIMMA ET AL. ED., supra note 44, at 786-854, 1376-84, 
1957-71, 2110-37.  
 61. U.N. Charter arts. 10-11, 13-14, 33, 36-37, 39-41; see also SYDNEY D. BAILEY & 
SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 18-21, 236-37 (3d ed. 1998); 
CRAWFORD, supra note 34, at 42; JORGE CASTANEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED 
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also trump treaty terms under the authority of Article 103.62 (Resolutions 
nonbinding under Charter terms can bind countries through acceptance 
of them as customary law, however.63) Thus action through U.N. 
principal organs can also bind parties in space law controversies.64 There 
is no “way out” of these realities, unless the central U.N. system is 
abolished. 
A message through the galaxies for space law might be binding 
authority given through treaties, even as UNCLOS allows parties to 
resort to the International Court of Justice for dispute resolution.65 If a 
litigant refuses to comply with a judgment, the aggrieved party can resort 
                                                                                                                       
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 78-79 (Alba Amoia trans., 1969); GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 
44, 111-29, 133-44, 257-65, 277-87, 290-314; JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 34, § 16; 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 103(2)(d) & r.2; SIMMA ET AL. ED., supra note 44, at 461-
506, 525-66, 1069-85, 1119-60, 1272-1329; ANDREAS ZIMMERMANN ET AL. EDS., THE 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 119-33 (2d ed. 2012); Robin R. 
Churchill, Conflicts between United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 84 INT’L L. STUDY SER. U.S. NAVAL 
WAR COLL. 143, 146-48 (2008) (analysis in context of UNCLOS, supra note 1, noting 
division of authorities).  
 62. W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 83, 87 (1993) (principles flowing from Council decisions pursuant to U.N. 
Charter arts. 25, 48, 103 are treaty law binding U.N. Members and override other treaty 
obligations). 
 63. See W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing and 
Arresting Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 57, 72-73 (2007-08) (citing Uniting 
For Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 3, 1950) – employed 
during the Korean War to continue U.N. operations); Legal Consequences of 
Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 
136, 148-51 (July 9); Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,1952 
I.C.J. 151, 163-71 (July 20). By parity of reasoning, an otherwise nonbinding Council 
resolution, e.g., a call for action, could evolve into a customary norm through State 
practice and acceptance of its standards as law. 
 64. This includes International Court of Justice [hereinafter ICJ] judgments. While 
I.C.J. Statute art. 59 declares the Court’s judgments lack precedential weight, U.N. 
Charter art. 94 authorizes the Security Council to issue a “decision,” upon a winning 
State’s petition, against a noncomplying State, in a case before the Court. See also 
GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 44, at 555-56; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY, supra note 44, at 1959-66; ZIMMERMANN ET AL. EDS., supra note 61, at 
1416-46. This possibility of a Council decision does not raise the judgment to precedent 
status, but it is a powerful message to litigants before the Court. See also Medellin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 511-12 (2008) for the Supreme Court view on ICJ decisions’ status 
in U.S. law. 
 65. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 286-99 (establishing procedures for binding 
decisions to resolve disputes, including resort to the International Court of Justice); see 
also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 15, ch. 19; 5 COMMENTARY, supra note 43, ¶¶ 
286.1-299.5; ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 445-59.  
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to the Security Council for a binding “decision.”66 A second message for 
the future is that a new governance mechanism for space, on the order of 
a U.N. specialized agency with broad rule or lawmaking authority, might 
include rule or lawmaking authority by a representative body through its 
constitutive treaty67 or a separate agreement.68 Should space law follow 
one of these routes? Or should space law chart a different course 
entirely?  
IV.  OTHER FACTORS 
The reality, sometimes painful, is that we live in an interconnected 
world. We are in a world of new States, with maybe more on the way.69 
Wars are as ever with us, but today they are more often non-international 
in nature.70 Non-state actors, e.g., terrorists, pirates and criminal gangs, 
are more virulent. Non-governmental organizations have proliferated, 
sometimes with conflicting messages on international law, a few of 
which are just plain wrong. We are in a time of instant communication 
by more people than ever before, courtesy of the Internet. We are also in 
an era of “lawfare,”71 where views on law (some of it inaccurate and 
                                                     
 66. U.N. Charter arts. 94(1), 103; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text. (A 
two-tier process would be necessary if the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
issues a decision that the losing State rejects. Then a winning State could institute new 
litigation in the ICJ to compel compliance if the Court has jurisdiction. After success in 
the ICJ, the judgment winner could invoke Articles 94(1) and 103 for a Council 
decision.) 
 67. E.g., new mandatory health standards through the World Health Organization. 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CONST. arts. 10, 19, 21-22, 24-37, 59-60, July 22, 1946, 
62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.  
 68. E.g., safety standards amendments through the alternative tacit acceptance 
procedure for the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, art. 8, Nov. 1, 
1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2, within the IMO, the U.N. specialized agency for 
many maritime matters. See generally Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, supra note 35, amended by Amendments to the 
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization of March 6, 
1948, Nov. 14, 1975, supra note 37; UNCLOS, supra note 1, has a similar model for 
Area governance. Id. arts. 156-91, i.e., within the constitutive document that also recites 
standards for States’ parties; see also CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 15, at 239-53; 6 
COMMENTARY, supra note 31, ¶¶ 156.1-191.7(b). 
 69. For example, South Sudan’s 2011 recognition as an independent State. The 
prospect of this may be greater today than when I wrote Integration, supra note 53, as the 
Cold War ended. 
 70. See generally ANN HIRONAKA, NEVERENDING WARS: THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY, WEAK STATES, AND THE PERPETUATION OF CIVIL WAR (2005). 
 71. Charles Dunlap, Legal Issues in Coalition Warfare: A US Perspective, 82 INT’L 
LAW STUDIES 222, 227 (2006). 
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often spread through open, accessible media like the Internet) can shape 
national and international decision-making.72 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
These thoughts may range far afield, or perhaps far at sea or far into 
deep space as more appropriate phrases for discussion and analysis, but I 
submit them for further consideration. However, as James Russell 
Lowell, a poet, lawyer, diplomat and ardent abolitionist, wrote in The 
Present Crisis over a century ago, “new occasions teach new duties; new 
truth makes ancient good uncouth.”73 It may be that models from the 
developing law of the sea will be useful in shaping the developing law of 
outer space; the reverse may be true, too.74 On the other hand, as Lowell 
advocated in The Present Crisis over a century and a half ago, perhaps it 
is the occasion for development of new duties and rules. Might some of 
the old rules and concepts, and maybe some of the new ones, supply 
principles and ultimately the law for cyberspace? 
 
                                                     
 72. The first of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, supra note 13, declared: “[o]pen 
covenants of peace, openly arrived at. . . .” The result was Covenant of the League of 
Nations art.18, requiring treaty registration with the League, not always obeyed and 
which was not binding on countries that were not League members, e.g. the United 
States. The Paris Peace Conference that included the League in its peace treaties was 
itself a confidential meeting in part. See generally MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: 
SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2002). There was further retrenchment on 
publicly available treaties after World War II; U.N. Charter art. 102 only requires their 
publication if they are cited within the United Nations. See also GOODRICH ET AL., supra 
note 44, at 610-14; THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 
44, at 2089-2109. National security considerations may keep a treaty in classified files, 
perhaps never to be in print or other public access source. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, 
§ 312 reporter’s n.5.  
 73. JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, The Present Crisis, in 1 JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, 
POETICAL WORKS 185, 190 (1890). 
 74. E.g., the “peaceful purposes” principle, first found in the Antarctic Treaty, supra 
note 3, establishing sea and land standards for that continent, next appeared in treaties for 
outer space and later still in UNCLOS, supra note 1. See supra notes 24, 30 and 
accompanying text. 
